

Andrea Martinangeli
PhD Candidate

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Citizenship: Italian

Fields of concentration:

Behavioural economics
Experimental economics
Public economics

Desired Teaching:

Microeconomics
Game theory
Behavioural and experimental economics

Dissertation: *Bitter divisions: Inequality, identity, and cooperation*

Expected completion date: June 2017

Degrees:

MSc in Economics (2011), University of Rome "Tor Vergata", Italy.
BSc in Political Science (2009), Peace processes, cooperation and development, University of Rome "Roma Tre", Italy.

Fellowships and awards:

Adlerbertska stipendiestiftelsen travel grants, 2012, 2013, 2016
SEB-Siamon stiftelsen travel grant, 2015

Teaching and supervision experience:

PhD Microeconomics, 2014-2016, teaching assistant
MSc Mathematics (economics and finance), 2015-2016, teaching assistant
Supervision: three theses in behavioural and environmental economics; 2015–2016

Other working experience:

Economist and statistician, United Nations FAO, Rome, Fall 2011-Spring 2012

Working papers:

"Overriding inequality: group identity and cooperation with asymmetric players"
"Cooperation in divided societies" (with Peter Martinsson)
"The coordinating power of transfers" (with Peter Martinsson and Amrish Patel)

“Exploring environmentally significant behaviours in a multidimensional perspective”
(with Mariangela Zoli), *EconPapers*, No 561

Work in progress:

“Ingroup trust and time pressure” (with Kinga Posadzy)

“Avoiding the focal point: bargaining with interested third party communication”

Conference and seminar presentations:

Linköping University, Department of Economics, October 19th, 2016

CNEE (Copenhagen Network for Experimental Economics), June 9, 2016, Lund

MBEES (Maastricht Behavioural Experimental Symposium), June 6, 2016, Maastricht

IMEBESS (International meeting on experimental and behavioural social sciences),

March 14-16, 2016, Rome

CNEE (Copenhagen Network for Experimental Economics), November 16, 2015, Copenhagen

IAREP-SABE (International association for research in economic psychology – Society for the advancement of behavioural economics), September 2-6, 2015, Sibiu, Romania

NCBEE (Nordic Conference on Behavioural and Experimental Economics), September 24-25, 2015, Tampere

Professional affiliations:

CNEE - Copenhagen Network for Experimental Economics

Languages

Italian (native), English (native), French (intermediate), Swedish (intermediate),
Spanish (basic), German (basic)

Other activities:

Organiser for the General Economics Seminar Series at the Department of Economics,
University of Gothenburg, Spring 2016

Chair of the Graduate Student Association of the Department of Economics, 2012-2013

References

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Dissertation abstract:

Successful cooperation is an elusive phenomenon, rapidly giving in to self-interest. Understanding the roots of such failures is thus crucial for the establishment of successful countermeasures. Social heterogeneity and fragmentation, both vertical (e.g. status) and horizontal (e.g. ethnicity), are shown to be associated with cooperation breakdowns. Much is however still unknown about the impacts of heterogeneity on societies more complex than single groups, and on the propensity of single individuals to engage in cooperation. *When* are individuals willing to cooperate, and *with whom*? It is unclear, that is, whether heterogeneity causes individuals' preferences for cooperation to drop per sé, or whether circumstances can be found in which individuals still cooperate at higher levels. Little is also known about *why* individuals refuse to cooperate when there is heterogeneity. Finally, and most importantly, can we exogenously intervene upon the perception of heterogeneity to restore cooperation?

I investigate these questions in a series of economic experiments designed to uncover cooperative patterns under income inequality that remain hidden in previous research.

In my first paper, **Overriding inequality: group identity, beliefs and cooperation with asymmetric players** (single authored, **job market paper**), I aim at tying inequality, group identification, and cooperative behaviours together. Cooperation drops when distinct social identities fragment the group. I argue that group fragmentation originating from asymmetric resource distributions can explain drops in cooperation associated with inequality. As a mechanism, I posit the formation of ingroup biases due to identification with income levels. These translate into more pessimistic beliefs about the prosociality of others with different endowment size from one's own. I find that indeed individuals form different beliefs about others according to difference or similarity in endowment, but that such patterns are not fully consistent with ingroup biases. Strikingly, the poor appear to be the most pessimistic subjects, expecting the least cooperation on behalf of *other poor subjects*. Cooperative behaviours are positively influenced by greater expectations about others' prosociality, regardless of endowment similarity.

Conversely, I hypothesise that a reinforced salience of the group's common identity can help overcome the negative effects of social fragmentation by reducing the salience of divisive traits (income). Indeed, group identity salience has a positive effect on cooperation, and such effect is mainly, but not exclusively, due to a strong and positive effect on individual beliefs. However, contrary to expectations, the salience of group heterogeneity is not reduced, and asymmetries in beliefs about others with endowment levels similar or different from one's own persist.

In the second paper, **Cooperation in Divided Societies**, coauthored with Peter Martinsson, we experimentally investigate how contributions to public goods are affected by group identification driven by income differences. We exogenously induce income heterogeneity in "societies" of 9 subjects by assigning heterogeneous endowments, and we allow subjects to participate in public good provision in multiple groups. One group is homogeneous (i.e. subjects have the same endowment). Another group collects subjects with different endowment levels. In a within subject design, we thus observe behaviours occurring with and without endowment heterogeneity. We hypothesise that subjects feel a stronger connection with the subjects sharing the same endowment level as theirs, and that homogeneous groups will therefore collect greater contributions. As a control, we observe behaviours in analogous "societies" in which all subjects are assigned the same endowment. We find that contributions are indeed lower in heterogeneous societies compared to homogeneous societies. This is mainly explained by lower contributions by the rich in heterogeneous groups, which are not offset by their *increase* in contributions in their homogeneous groups. This is consistent with the activation of strong social identity effects among the subjects as a result of inter-class social comparison.

In my third paper, **The coordinating power of transfers** (with Peter Martinsson and Amrish Patel), we investigate the salience of egalitarian outcomes in coordination games. Tacit coordination under conflict of interests is notoriously problematic. Salient action choices and past behaviours can facilitate coordination by helping players form expectations about each other's future play, while equal (symmetric) and socially optimal outcomes might be chosen by inequality averse players and social efficiency optimisers. According to the focal points literature, symmetric outcomes can be strong attractors of people's choices. We experimentally explore individuals' use of the opportunity to voluntarily introduce a symmetric equilibrium, and its impact on coordination. In doing so, we allow players the choice to unilaterally reduce their own payoffs by a fixed amount in a first stage, to make a symmetric equilibrium available after a second-stage Battle of Sexes game. We maintain aggregate payoffs constant across subgames and equilibria, avoiding thus concerns over efficiency to influence play. Further, we avoid reciprocity between the players of the coordination game influencing results by introducing a dummy player, with no stake in the coordination game, who will receive the payoff subtracted from the first stage decision maker. We find that after a symmetric outcome is made available in the game, coordination rates in the Battle of Sexes greatly improve over the baseline (unmodified) game, increasing from 47% to over 80%. Cognitive hierarchy models cannot explain our data. We run an additional control in which the symmetric equilibrium is made available by the experimenters, with coordination occurring approximately 60% of times. Based on these results, inequality aversion, equilibrium salience and forward induction offer partial explanations. On the other hand, team reasoning can fully account for observed behaviours.